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Abstract
A mediator can help non-cooperative agents obtain an equilibrium that may oth-
erwise not be possible. We study the ability of players to obtain the same equilibrium
without a mediator, using only cheap talk, that is, nonbinding pre-play communication.
Previous work has considered this problem in a synchronous setting. Here we consider
the effect of asynchrony on the problem, and provide upper bounds for implementing
mediators. Considering asynchronous environments introduces new subtleties, includ-
ing exactly what solution concept is most appropriate and determining what move is
played if the cheap talk goes on forever. Different results are obtained depending on
whether the move after such “infinite play” is under the control of the players or part
of the description of the game.
1 Introduction
Having a trusted mediator often makes solving a problem much easier. For example, a
problem such as Byzantine agreement becomes trivial with a mediator: agents can just send
their initial input to the mediator, and the mediator sends the majority value back to all
the agents, which they then output. Not surprisingly, the question of whether a problem
∗Danny Dolev is Incumbent of the Berthold Badler Chair in Computer Science.
†Supported in part by NSF grants IIS-1703846.
‡Supported in part by NSF grants IIS-1703846 and IIS-0911036, and ARO grant W911NF-17-1-0592, and
a grant from Open Philanthropy.
in a multiagent system that can be solved with a trusted mediator can be solved by just
the agents in the system, without the mediator, has attracted a great deal of attention
in both computer science (particularly in the cryptography community) and game theory.
In cryptography, the focus has been on secure multiparty computation [11, 14]. Here it is
assumed that each agent i has some private information xi. Fix functions f1, . . . , fn. The
goal is to have agent i learn fi(x1, . . . , xn) without learning anything about xj for j 6= i
beyond what is revealed by the value of fi(x1, . . . , xn). With a trusted mediator, this is
trivial: each agent i just gives the mediator its private value xi; the mediator then sends
each agent i the value fi(x1, . . . , xn). Work on multiparty computation provides conditions
under which this can be done in a synchronous system [6, 11, 13, 14] and in an asynchronous
system [5, 7]. In game theory, the focus has been on whether an equilibrium in a game
with a mediator can be implemented using what is called cheap talk—that is, just by players
communicating among themselves.
In the computer science literature, the interest has been in performing multiparty com-
putation in the presence of possibly malicious adversaries, who do everything they can to
subvert the computation. On the other hand, in the game theory literature, the assumption
is that players have preferences and seek to maximize their utility; thus, they will subvert
the computation iff it is in their best interests to do so. In [1, 2] (denoted ADGH and ADH,
respectively, in the rest of the paper), it was argued that it is important to consider devia-
tions by both rational players, who have preferences and try to maximize them, and players
that we can view as malicious, although it is perhaps better to think of them as rational
players whose utilities are not known by the mechanism designer (or other players). ADGH
and ADH considered equilibria that are (k, t)-robust ; roughly speaking, this means that the
equilibrium tolerates deviations by up to k rational players, whose utilities are presumed
known, and up to t players with unknown utilities. Tight bounds were proved on the ability
to implement a (k, t)-robust equilibrium in the game with a mediator using cheap talk in
synchronous systems. These bounds depend on, among other things, (a) the relationship
between k, t and n, the total number of players in the system; (b) whether players know the
exact utilities of the rational players; and (c) whether the game has a punishment strategy,
where an m-punishment strategy is a strategy profile that, if used by all but at most m play-
ers, guarantees that every player gets a worse outcome than they do with the equilibrium
strategy. The following is a high-level overview of results proved in the synchronous setting
that will be of most relevance here. For these results, we assume that the communication
with the mediator is bounded, it lasts for at most N rounds, and that the mediator can be
represented by an arithmetic circuit of depth c.
R1. If n > 3k + 3t, then a mediator can be implemented using cheap talk; no punishment
strategy is required, no knowledge of other agents’ utilities is required, and the cheap-
talk protocol has bounded running time O(nNc), independent of the utilities.
R2. If n > 2k+3t, then a mediator can be implemented using cheap talk if there is a (k+t)-
punishment strategy and the utilities of the rational players are known; the cheap-talk
protocol has expected running time O(nNc). (In R2, unlike R1, the cheap-talk game
may be unbounded, although it has finite expected running time.)
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In ADH, lower bounds are presented that match the upper bounds above. Thus, for
example, it is shown that n > 3k + 3t is necessary in R1; if n ≤ 3k + 3t, then we cannot
implement a mediator in general if we do not have a punishment strategy or if the utilities
are unknown. The proofs of the upper bounds make heavy use of the fact that the setting
is synchronous. Here we consider the impact of asynchrony on these results. Once we
introduce asynchrony, we must revisit the question of what it even means to implement an
equilibrium using cheap talk. Notions like (Bayesian) Nash equilibrium implicitly assume
that all uncertainty is described probabilistically. Having a probability is necessary to talk
about an agent’s expected utility, given that a certain strategy profile is played. If we were
willing to put a distribution on how long messages take to arrive and on when agents are
scheduled to move, then we could apply notions like Nash equilibrium without difficulty.
However, it is notoriously difficult to quantify this uncertainty. The typical approach used
to analyze algorithms in the presence of uncertainty that is not quantified probabilistically is
to assume that all the non-probabilistic uncertainty is resolved by the environment according
to some strategy. Thus, the environment uses some strategy to decide when each agent will
be allowed to play and how long each message takes to be delivered. The algorithm is
then proved correct no matter what strategy the environment is following in some class of
strategies. For example, we might restrict the environment’s strategy to being fair, so that
every agent eventually gets a chance to move. (See [12] for a discussion of this approach and
further references.)
We follow this approach in the context of games. Note that once we fix the environment’s
strategy, we have an ordinary game, where uncertainty is quantified by probability. In
this setting, we can consider what is called ex post equilibrium. A strategy is an ex post
equilibrium if it is an equilibrium no matter what strategy the environment uses. Ex post
equilibrium is a strong notion, but, as we show by example, it can often be attained with
the help of a mediator. We believe that it is the closest analogue to Nash equilibrium in an
asynchronous setting.
Another issue that plays a major role in an asynchronous setting is what happens if the
strategies of players result in some players being livelocked, talking indefinitely without mak-
ing a move in the underlying game, or in some players being deadlocked, waiting indefinitely
without moving in the underlying game. We consider two approaches for dealing with this
problem. One way to decide what action to assign to a player that fails to make a decision
in the cheap-talk phase is the default-move approach. In this approach, as part of the de-
scription of the game, there is a default move for each player which is imposed if that player
fails to explicitly make a move in the cheap-talk phase. Aumann and Hart [4] considered
a different approach, which we henceforth call the AH approach, where a player’s strategy
in the underlying game is a function of the (possibly infinite) history of the player in the
cheap-talk phase. We can think of this almost as a player writing a will, describing what he
would like to do (as a function of the history) if the game ends before he has had a chance
to move.
We believe that both the AH approach and the default-move approach are reasonable in
different contexts. The AH approach makes sense if the agent can leave instructions that
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will be carried out by an “executor” if the cheap-talk game deadlocks. But if we consider
a game-theoretic variant of Byzantine agreement, it seems more reasonable to say that if a
malicious agent can prevent an agent from making a move in finite time, the agent should
not get a chance to make a move after the cheap-talk phase has ended.
Our results show that, in the worst case, the cost of asynchrony is an extra k + t in the
bounds on n, but we can sometimes save k or even k + t if there is a punishment strategy
or if we are willing to tolerate an ǫ “error”. For example, with both the AH approach and
the default-move approach, if the utilities are not known, we can implement a mediator
using asynchronous cheap talk if n > 4k + 4t. Thus, compared to R1, we need an extra
k + t. However, if we are willing to accept a small probability of error, so that rather than
implementing the mediator we get only an ǫ-implementation, and are also willing to accept
ǫ-(k,t)-robustness (which, roughly speaking, means that players get within ǫ of the best they
could get), then we can do this if n > 3k + 3t, again, using both the AH approach and the
default-move approach.
Just as in the synchronous case, we can do better if we assume that there is a punishment
strategy and utilities are known (as in R2). Specifically, with the AH approach, we can
implement a mediator if n > 3k+4t (compared to n > 2k+3t in the synchronous case, and
can ǫ-implement a mediator if n > 2k+3t. We use the punishment to deal with deadlock. If
a good player is waiting for a message that never arrives, then the waiting player instructs
his executor to carry out a punishment in his will. Having a punishment does not seem to
help in the default-move approach unless the default move is a punishment; if it is, then we
can get the same results as with the AH approach.
If there is a punishment strategy, these results significantly improve those of Even, Gol-
dreich, and Lempel [9]. They provide a protocol with similar properties, but the expected
number of messages sent is O(1/ǫ); with a punishment strategy, a bounded number of mes-
sages is sent, with the bound being independent of ǫ.
2 Definitions
Asynchronous games, mediator games, and cheap talk: We are interested in imple-
menting mediators. Formally, this means we need to consider three games: an underlying
game Γ, an extension Γd of Γ with a mediator, and an extension ΓCT of Γ with (asyn-
chronous) cheap-talk. We assume that Γ is a normal-form Bayesian game: each player has
a type t taken from some type space Ti, such that there is a commonly known distribution
on T ⊆ T1 × · · · × Tn, the set of types; each player i chooses an action a ∈ Ai, the set of
actions of agent i; player i’s utility ui is determined by the type profile of the players and
the actions they take. A strategy for player i in the Bayesian game is just a function Ti to
Ai, which tells player i what to do, given his type. If A = A1 × · · · × An, then a strategy
profile ~σ = (σ1, . . . , σn) can be viewed as a function ~σ : T → ∆(A) (where, as usual, ∆(X)
denotes the set of probability distributions on X).
The basic notions of a game with a mediator, a cheap-talk game, and implementation are
standard in the game-theory literature. However, since we consider them in an asynchronous
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setting, we must modify the definitions somewhat.
We first define asynchronous games. In an asynchronous game, we assume that players
alternate making moves with the environment—first the environment moves, then a player
moves, then the environment moves, and so on. The environment’s move consists of choosing
a player i to move next and a set of messages in transit to i that will be delivered just before i
moves (so that i’s move can depend on the messages i receives). The environment is subject
to two constraints: all messages sent must eventually be delivered and, for all times m and
players i, if i is still playing the game at time m, then there must be some time m′ ≥ m that
i is chosen to move. We can describe an asynchronous game by a game tree. Associated
with each non-leaf node or history is either a player—the player whose move it is at that
node—or the environment (which can make a randomized move). The nodes where a player
i moves are further partitioned into information sets ; intuitively, these are nodes that player
i cannot tell apart. We assume that the environment has complete information, so that the
environment’s information sets just consist of the singletons. A strategy for player i is a
(possibly randomized) function from i’s information sets to actions; we can similarly define a
strategy for the environment. We can essentially view the environment strategy as defining
a scheduler (and thus we sometimes refer to an environment strategy as a scheduler).
For our results, we start with an n-player Bayesian game Γ in normal form (called the
underlying game), with {1, . . . , n} being the set of players, and then consider two types of
games that extend Γ. A game Γ′ extends Γ if the players have initial types from the same
type space as Γ, with the same distribution over types; moreover, in each path of the game
tree for Γ′, the players send and receive messages, and perform at most one action from Γ.
In a history where each player makes a move from Γ, each player gets the same utility as
in Γ (where the utility is a function of the moves made and the types). That leaves open
the question of what happens in a complete history of Γ′ where some players do not make
a move in Γ. As we suggested in the introduction, we consider two approaches to dealing
with this. In the first approach, we assume that the description of Γ′ includes a function Mi
for each player i that maps player i’s type to a move in Γ. In an infinite history h where
i has type t and does not make a move in Γ, i is viewed as having made move Mi(t). We
can then define each player’s utility in h as above. This is the default-move approach. In
the AH approach, we extend the notion of strategy so that i’s strategy in Γ′ also describes
what move i makes in the underlying game Γ in any infinite history h where i has not made
a move in Γ. In the AH approach, i’s move in h is under i’s control; in the default-move
approach, it is not.
Given an underlying Bayesian game Γ (which we assume is synchronous—the players
move simultaneously), we will be interested in two types of extensions. A mediator game ex-
tending Γ is an asynchronous game where players can send messages to and receive messages
from a mediator (who can be viewed as a trusted third party) as well as making a move in
Γ; “good” or “honest” players do not send messages to each other, but “bad” players (i.e.,
one of the k rational deviating players or one of the t “malicious” players with unknown
utilities) may send messages to each other as well as to the mediator. We assume that the
space of possible messages that can be sent in a mediator game is fixed and finite.
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In an asynchronous cheap-talk game extending Γ, there is no mediator. Players send
messages to each other via asynchronous channels, as well as making a move in Γ. We assume
that each pair of agents communicates over an asynchronous secure private channel (the fact
that the channels are secure means that an adversary cannot eavesdrop on conversations
between the players). We assume that each player can identify the sender of each message.
Finally, we assume that in both the mediator game and the cheap-talk game, when a player
is first scheduled, it gets a signal that the game has started (either an external signal from
the environment, or a game-related message from another player or the mediator).
Implementation: In the synchronous setting, a strategy profile ~σ′ in a cheap-talk ΓCT
extending an underlying game Γ implements a strategy ~σ in a mediator game Γd extending
Γ if ~σ and ~σ′ correspond to the same strategy in Γ; that is, they induce the same function
from T to ∆(A). The notion of implementation is more complicated in an asynchronous
setting, because the probability on action profiles also depends on the environment strategy.
Because ΓCT and Γd are quite different games, the environment’s strategies in ΓCT are quite
different from those in Γd. So we now say that ~σ
′ implements ~σ if the set of distributions
on actions profiles in Γ induced by ~σ and all possible choices of environment strategy is the
same as that induced by ~σ′ and all possible choices of environment strategy. More precisely,
let SΓ′,e and SΓ′′,e denote the the set of environment strategies in Γ′ and Γ′′, respectively. A
strategy σe ∈ SΓ′,e and a strategy profile ~σ for the players in Γ′ together induce a function
(~σ, σe) from T to ∆(A). A strategy profile ~σ′ in Γ′ implements a strategy profile ~σ′′ in Γ′′ if
{(~σ′, σ′e) : σ′e ∈ SΓ′,e} = {(~σ′′, σ′′e ) : σ′′e ∈ SΓ′′,e}. Since the outcome that arises if the players
use a particular strategy may depend on what the environment does, this says that the set
of outcomes that can result if the players use ~σ′ is the same as the set of outcomes that can
result if the players use ~σ′′.
For some of our results, we cannot get an exact implementation; there may be some
error. Given two discrete distributions π and π′ on some space S, the distance between π
and π′, denoted dist(π, π′), is at most ǫ if
∑
s∈S |π(s)− π′(s)| ≤ ǫ. As we observed earlier,
in the mediator game and the cheap-talk game, Recall that a strategy profile ~σ for the
players and a strategy σe for the environment together induce a mapping from type profiles
to ∆(A). We lift the notion of distance to such function by defining dist((~σ, σe)), (~σ
′, σ′e)) =
max~x∈T dist((~σ, σe)(~x), (~σ
′, σ′e)(~x)). Say that ~σ
′ ǫ-implements ~σ′′ if
• for all σ′e ∈ SΓ′,e there exists σ′′e ∈ SΓ′′,e such that dist((~σ′, σ′e), ( ~σ′′, σ′′e )) ≤ ǫ; and
• for all σ′′e ∈ SΓ′′,e there exists σ′e ∈ SΓ′,e such that dist((~σ′′, σ′′e ), (~σ′, σ′e)) ≤ ǫ.
Note that ~σ′ implements ~σ′′ iff ~σ′ 0-implements ~σ′′.
The notion of implementation is quite strong. For example, if ~σ′ involves fewer rounds
of communication than ~σ′′, there may be far fewer distinct schedulers in the game involving
~σ′ than in the game involving ~σ′′. Thus, we may not be able to recover the effect of all
possible schedulers. (Indeed, for some of our results the implementation needs to be quite
long precisely in order to capture all possible schedulers.) This suggests the following notion:
a strategy profile ~σ′ in Γ′ weakly implements a strategy profile ~σ′′ in Γ′′ if {(~σ′, σ′e) : σ′e ∈
SΓ′,e} ⊆ {(~σ′′, σ′′e ) : σ′′e ∈ SΓ′′,e}. Thus, if ~σ′ weakly implements ~σ′′, then every outcome of ~σ′
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is one that could also have arisen with ~σ′′, but the converse may not be true. Specifically,
there may be some behaviors of the environment with ~σ′′ that cannot be simulated by ~σ′.
As we shall see, this may actually be a feature: we can sometimes simulate the effect of only
“good” schedulers. In any case, note that in the synchronous setting, implementation and
weak implementation coincide. We can also define a notion of weak ǫ-implementation in
the obvious way; we leave the details to the reader.
Termination: We will be interested in asynchronous games where, almost surely, the
honest players stop sending messages and make a move in the underlying game. In the
mediator games that we consider, this happens after only a bounded number of messages
have been sent. But even with this bound, there may not be a point in a history when
players know that they can stop sending messages; although a player i may have moved in
the underlying game, i may still need to keep checking for incoming message, and may need
to respond to them, to ensure that other players can make the appropriate move.
For some of our results, we must assume that, in the mediator game, there comes a
point when all honest players know that they have terminated the protocol; they will not
get further messages from the mediator and can stop sending messages to the mediator, and
should make a move in the underlying game if they have not done so yet. For simplicity, for
these results, we restrict the honest players and the mediator to using strategy profiles that
have the following canonical form: Using a canonical strategy, player i sends a message to
the mediator in response to a message from the mediator that does not include “STOP” if it
has not halted, and these are the only messages that i sends, in addition to an initial message
to the mediator. If player i gets a message from the mediator that includes “STOP”, then
i makes a move in the underlying game and halts. We assume that, as long as the honest
players and mediator follow their part of the canonical strategy profile, there is a constant r
such that, no matter what strategy the rational and malicious players and the environment
use, the mediator sends each player i at most r messages in each history, and the final message
includes “STOP”. We conjecture that the assumption that players and mediator are using
a strategy in canonical form in the mediator game is without loss of generality; that is, a
(k, t)-robust strategy profile in a mediator game Γd can be implemented by a (k, t)-robust
strategy profile in Γd that is in canonical form. However, we have not proved this conjecture
yet.
3 Solution concepts
In this section, we review the solution concepts introduced in ADGH and extend them to
asynchronous settings.
Note that in an asynchronous game Γ, the utility of a player i can depend not only
on the strategies of the agents, but on what the environment does. Since we consider an
underlying game, a mediator game, and a cheap-talk game, it is useful to include explicitly
in the utility function which game is being considered. Thus, we write ui(Γ, ~σ, σd, σe, ~x) to
denote the expected utility of player i in game Γ when players play strategy profile ~σ, the
mediator plays σd, the environment plays σe, and the type profile is ~x. We typically say
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“input profile” rather than “type profile”, since in our setting, the type of player i is just
i’s initial input. Note that if Γ is the underlying game, the σe component is unnecessary,
since the underlying game is assumed to be synchronous. We occasionally omit the mediator
strategy σd when it is clear from context.
Given a type space T , a set K of players, and ~x ∈ T , let T (~xK) = {~x ′ : ~x ′K = ~xK}. If Γ
is a Bayesian game over type space T , ~σ is a strategy profile in Γ, and Pr is the probability
on the type space T , let
ui(Γ, ~σ, σe, ~xK) =
∑
~x ′∈T (~xK)
Pr(~x ′ | T (~xK)) ui(Γ, ~σ, σe, ~x′).
Thus, ui(Γ, ~σ, σe, ~xK) is i’s expected payoff if everyone uses strategy ~σ and type profiles are
in T (~xK).
k-resilient equilibrium: In a standard game, a strategy profile is a Nash equilibrium
if no player can gain any advantage by using a different strategy, given that all the other
players do not change their strategies. The notion of k-resilient equilibrium extends Nash
equilibrium to allow for coalitions.
Definition 3.1. ~σ is a k-resilient equilibrium (resp., strongly k-resilient equilibrium) in an
asynchronous game Γ if, for all subsets K of players with 1 ≤ |K| ≤ k, all strategy profiles
~τK for the players in K, all type profiles ~x ∈ T , and all strategies σe of the environment,
ui(Γ, (~σ−K , ~τK), σe, ~xK) ≤ ui(Γ, ~σ, σe, ~xK) for some (resp., all) i ∈ K.1
Thus, ~σ is k-resilient if, no matter what the environment does, no subset K of at most
k players can all do better by deviating, even if they share their type information (so that
if the true type is ~x, the players in K know ~xK). It is strongly k-resilient if not even one of
the players in K can do better if all the players in K deviate.
For some of our results we will be interested in equilibria that are “almost” k-resilient, in
the sense that no player in a coalition can do more than ǫ better if the coalition its strategy,
for some small ǫ.
Definition 3.2. For ǫ > 0, ~σ is an ǫ-k-resilient equilibrium (resp., strongly ǫ-k-resilient equi-
librium) if, for all subsets K of players, all strategy profiles ~τK for the players in K, all type
profiles ~x ∈ T , and all strategies σe of the environment, we have ui(Γ, (~σ−K , ~τK), σe, ~xK) <
ui(Γ, ~σ, σe, ~xK) + ǫ for some (resp., for all) i ∈ K.
Note that we have “< ui(Γ, ~σ, σe, ~xK) + ǫ” here, not “≤”; this means that a 0-k-resilient
equilibrium is not a k-resilient equilibrium. However, an equilibrium is k-resilient iff it is
ǫ-k-resilient for all ǫ > 0. We have used this slightly nonstandard definition to make the
statements of our theorems cleaner.
Robustness: A standard assumption in game theory is that utilities are (commonly)
known; when we are given a game we are also given each player’s utility. When players
1As usual, the strategy profile (~σ−K , ~τK) is the one where each player i ∈ K plays τi and each player
i /∈ K plays σi.
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make decision, they can take other players’ utilities into account. However, in large systems,
it seems almost invariably the case that there will be some fraction of users who do not
respond to incentives the way we expect. For example, in a peer-to-peer network like Kazaa
or Gnutella, it would seem that no rational agent should share files. Whether or not you
can get a file depends only on whether other people share files; on the other hand, it seems
that there are disincentives for sharing (the possibility of lawsuits, use of bandwidth, etc.).
Nevertheless, people do share files. However, studies of the Gnutella network have shown
almost 70 percent of users share no files and nearly 50 percent of responses are from the
top 1 percent of sharing hosts [3]. It seems important to design protocols that tolerate
such unanticipated behaviors, so that the payoffs of the users who follow the recommended
strategy do not get affected by players who deviate, provided that not too many deviate.
Definition 3.3. A strategy profile ~σ is t-immune in a game Γ if, for all subsets T of players
with |T | ≤ t, all strategy profiles ~τ , all i /∈ T , all type profiles ~x ∈ T , and all strategies σe of
the environment, we have ui(Γ, (~σ−T , ~τT ), σe, ~xT ) ≥ ui(Γ, ~σ, σe, ~xT ).
Intuitively, ~σ is t-immune if there is nothing that player in a set T of size at most t can
do to give the players not in T a worse payoff, even if the players in T share their type
information.
The notion of t-immunity and k-resilience address different concerns. For t-immunity,
we consider the payoffs of the players K. It is natural to combine both notions. Given a
strategy profile ~τ , let ΓT~τ be the game which is identical to Γ except that the players in T
are fixed to playing strategy ~τT .
Definition 3.4. ~σ is a (strongly) (k, t)-robust equilibrium in a game Γ if ~σ is t-immune and,
for all subsets T of players with |T | ≤ t and all strategy profiles ~τ , (~σ−T , ~τT ) is a (strongly)
k-resilient equilibrium of ΓT~τ .
We can define “approximate” notions of t-immunity and (k, t)-robustness analogous to
Definition 3.2:
Definition 3.5. For ǫ > 0, a strategy profile ~σ is ǫ-t-immune in Γ if, for all subsets T
of players with |T | ≤ t, all strategy profiles ~τ , all i /∈ T , all type profiles ~x ∈ T , and all
strategies σe of the environment, we have ui(Γ, (~σ−T , ~τT ), σe, ~xT ) > ui(Γ, ~σ, σe, ~xT )− ǫ.
Definition 3.6. For ǫ ≥ 0, ~σ is a (strongly) ǫ-(k, t)-robust equilibrium in Γ if ~σ is ǫ-t-
immune and, for all subsets T of players with |T | ≤ t and strategy profiles ~τT , (~σ−T , ~τT ) is a
(strongly) ǫ-k-resilient equilibrium of ΓT~τ .
4 Main theorems: formal statements
In this section, we state our results formally. Just as with R1 and R2, for these results
we assume that the communication in the mediator game is bounded. But since “rounds”
is not meaningful in asynchronous systems, we express the bounds in terms of number of
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messages. Specifically, we assume that at most N messages are sent in all histories of the
mediator game, and that the mediator can be represented by an arithmetic circuit with at
most c gates.
We begin with a result that is an analogue of R1 in the asynchronous setting. We say
that a game Γ′ is a utility variant of a game Γ if Γ′ and Γ have the same game tree, but the
utilities of the players may be different in Γ and Γ′. We use the notation Γ(~u) if we want
to emphasize that ~u is the utility function in game Γ. We then take Γ(~u′) to be the utility
variant of Γ with utility function ~u′.
One more technical comment before stating the theorems: in the mediator game we can
also view the mediator as a player (albeit one without a utility function) that is following a
strategy. Thus, when we talk about a strategy profile that is a (k, t)-robust equilibrium in
the mediator game, we must give the mediator’s strategy as well as the players’ strategies.
We sometimes write ~σ+ σd if we want to distinguish the players’ strategy profile ~σ from the
mediator’s strategy σd. We occasionally abuse notation and drop the σd if it is clear from
context, and just talk about ~σ being a (k, t)-robust equilibrium.
Theorem 4.1. If Γ is a normal-form Bayesian game with n players, ~σ + σd is a strategy
profile for the players and the mediator in an asynchronous mediator game Γd that extends
Γ, and n > 4k + 4t, then with both the default-move approach and the AH approach, there
exists a strategy profile ~σCT that implements ~σ+σd in the asynchronous cheap-talk game ΓCT
such that for all utility variants Γd(~u
′) of Γd, if ~σ+σd is a (strongly) (k, t)-robust equilibrium
in Γd(~u
′), then ~σCT is a (strongly) (k, t)-robust equilibrium in ΓCT (~u
′), and the number of
messages sent in a history of ~σCT is O(nNc), independent of ~u
′.
The proof of Theorem 4.1 uses ideas from the multiparty computation protocol of Ben-Or,
Canetti, and Goldreich [5] (BCG from now on). Our construction actually needs stronger
properties than these provided by BCG; we show that we can get protocols with these
stronger properties in a companion paper [10]; see Section 5 for further discussion.
We can obtain better bounds if we are willing to accept ǫ-equilibrium, using ideas due to
Ben-Or, Kelmer, and Rabin [7].
Theorem 4.2. If Γ is a normal-form Bayesian game with n players, ~σ + σd is a strategy
profile for the players and mediator in an asynchronous mediator game Γd that extends Γ,
M > 0, and n > 3k+3t, then with both the default-move approach and the AH approach, for
all ǫ > 0, there exists a strategy profile ~σCT in the asynchronous cheap-talk game ΓCT that
ǫ-implements ~σ such that for all utility variants Γd(~u
′) of Γd bounded by M/2 (i.e., where the
range of u′i is contained in [−M/2,M/2]), if ~σ + σd is a (strongly) (k, t)-robust equilibrium
in Γd(~u
′), then ~σCT is a (strongly) ǫ-(k, t)-robust equilibrium in ΓCT (~u
′), and the number of
messages sent in a history of ~σCT is O(nNc), independent of ~u
′.
If we have a punishment strategy and utilities are known, we can do better with the AH
approach. To make this precise, we need the definition of an m-punishment strategy [1]
(which generalizes the notion of punishment strategy defined by Ben Porath [8]). Before
defining this carefully, note that in an asynchronous setting (i.e., in the mediator game and
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the cheap-talk game, but not in the underlying game), the utility of players depends on the
environment’s strategy as well as the players’ strategy profile and the players’ type profile.
Definition 4.3. If Γ′ is an extension of an underlying game Γ, a strategy profile ~ρ in Γ is
a k-punishment strategy with respect to a strategy profile ~σ′ in Γ′ if for all subsets K of
players with 1 ≤ |K| ≤ k, all strategy profiles ~σ in Γ, all strategies σe for the environment,
all type profiles ~x ∈ T , and all players i ∈ K, we have
ui(Γ
′, ~σ′, σe, ~xK) > ui(Γ, (~σK , ~ρ−K), ~xK).
Thus, if ~ρ is a k-punishment strategy with respect to ~σ′, if all but k players play their
part of ~ρ in the underlying tame, then all of the remaining players will be worse off than
they would be in Γ′ if everyone had played ~σ′, no matter what they do in the underlying
game.
Theorem 4.4. If Γ is a normal-form Bayesian game with n players, ~σ + σd is a strategy
profile in canonical form for the players and mediator in an asynchronous mediator game Γd
that extends Γ, there is a (k+ t)-punishment strategy with respect to ~σ+σd, and n > 3k+4t,
then with the AH approach, there exists a strategy profile ~σCT that implements ~σ+ σd in the
asynchronous cheap-talk game ΓCT , and if ~σ + σd is a (strongly) (k, t)-robust equilibrium in
Γd, then ~σCT is a (strongly) (k, t)-robust equilibrium in ΓCT . If there exists a strong (k+ t)-
punishment strategy or we require only that ~σCT is a weak implementation, then the number
of messages in a history of ~σCT is O(nc) (and ~σCT continues to be a (strongly) (k, t)-robust
equilibrium in ΓCT if ~σ is a (strongly) (k, t)-robust equilibrium in Γd).
Note that in Theorem 4.4, the running time of the algorithm is significantly affected by
whether we want ~σCT to implement ~σ or whether a weak implementation suffices.
If we assume both that there is a (2k + 2t)-punishment strategy and that utilities are
known, we can get an analogue to R2, but with an ǫ error.
Theorem 4.5. If Γ is a normal-form Bayesian game with n players, ~σ + σd is a strategy
profile in canonical form for the players and mediator in an asynchronous mediator game Γd
that extends Γ, there is a (2k+2t)-punishment strategy with respect to ~σ+σd, and n > 2k+3t,
then with the AH approach, for all ǫ > 0 there is a strategy ~σCT that ǫ-implements ~σ in the
asynchronous cheap-talk game ΓCT such that if ~σ+σd is a (strongly) (k, t)-robust equilibrium
in Γd, then ~σCT is a (strongly) ǫ-(k, t)-robust equilibrium in ΓCT , and the number of messages
sent in a history of ~σCT is O(n2
Nc). If there exists a strong (k, t)-punishment strategy or we
require only that ~σCT is a weak implementation, then the number of messages in a history
of ~σCT is O(nc) (and ~σCT continues to be a (strongly) (k, t)-robust equilibrium in ΓCT if ~σ
is a (strongly) (k, t)-robust equilibrium in Γd).
We prove these results using ideas in the spirit of ADGH, but much more care must be
taken to deal with asynchrony. Among other things, we need stronger security guarantees
than are traditionally provided for multiparty communication; see Section 5 for details. We
provide proofs of all the results in Section 6.
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5 t-bisimulation and t-emulation
To construct the cheap-talk protocol for Theorems 4.1 and 4.2, we use ideas from a companion
paper [10], where we provide constructions that extend the security guarantees given by the
multi-party computation protocols for the synchronous case by Ben-Or, Goldwasser, and
Wigderson [6] (BGW from now on) and the asynchronous case by Ben-Or, Canetti, and
Goldreich [5] (BCG from now on). We briefly review the main details here.
BGW/BCG show that if a function f of n inputs provided by n players can be computed
using a mediator, then it can be computed by the players without the mediator and without
revealing any information beyond the function value, even when some of the players are
malicious. BGW deals with the synchronous case and tolerates up to n/3 malicious players,
while BCG deals with the asynchronous case and tolerates up to n/4. The notion of not
revealing any information is made precise by defining a set of ideal distributions over possible
values of the function, and ensuring that the real distribution is identically distributed to
one of those (see BGW and BCG for formal definitions and details).
We can view a mediator game as computing an action profile in the underlying game; the
ideal distributions are the possible distributions over action profiles when the honest players
play their component of the (k, t)-robust equilibrium strategy profile in the mediator game.
BCG’s protocol then essentially gives us a strategy in the cheap-talk game. However, the
BCG protocol is not sufficient for our purposes for two reasons: it does not guarantee that
the real protocol is an implementation of the ideal protocol in the sense of the definition in
Section 2 (although it does suffice for weak implementation), nor does it guarantee that the
protocol is a (k, t)-robust equilibrium. To prove these stronger results, we show that ~σCT
can be constructed so as to satisfy some additional security properties, which we now define.
Definition 5.1 (t-bisimulation). Take an adversary A to be a pair (~τT , σe) consisting of a
strategy for the malicious players and an environment strategy. Let O(~π + πd, A, ~x) be the
distribution over outputs when running strategy ~π with adversary A = (τT , σe). Protocol ~π
′
t-bisimulates ~π + πd if, for all T with |T | ≤ t and inputs ~x:
• for all adversaries A = (~τT , σe), there exists an adversary A′ = (~τ ′T , σ′e) such that
O(~π + πd, A, ~x) and O(~π
′, A′, ~x) are identically distributed;
• for all adversaries A′ = (~τ ′T , σ′e), there exists an adversary A = (~τT , σe) such that
O(~π + πd, A, ~x) and O(~π
′, A′, ~x) are identically distributed.
For one direction of the simulation, we need an even tighter correspondence between
deviations in the cheap-talk game and deviations in the mediator game. This is made precise
in the following definition.
Definition 5.2 (t-emulation). The protocol ~π′ t-emulates ~π if, for every scheduler σ′e, there
exists a function H from strategies to strategies such that H(π′i) = πi for all players i and, for
all sets T of players with |T | ≤ t and all adversaries A′ = (~τ ′T , σ′e), there exists an adversary
A = (~τT , σe) such that, for all input profiles ~x, O(~π, A, ~x) and O(π
′, A′, ~x) are identically
distributed, where ~τT = H(~τ
′
−T ) (and we take H(τ
′
1, . . . , τ
′
m) = (H(τ1), . . . , H(τ
′
m))).
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There are two significant differences between t-bisimulation and t-emulation. As the
name suggests, with t-bisimulation, we require simulation in both directions (for every ~τ
and σe there is a ~τ
′ and σ′e, and vice versa); for emulation, we have only one direction. On
the other hand, with t-emulation, the strategy ~τ ′i depends only on ~τi and σe, whereas with
t-bisimulation, ~τ ′i can also depend on σ
′
e and all the strategies in ~τ .
Note that 0-bisimulation is equivalent to implementation, while 0-emulation is equivalent
to weak implementation. Implementation and weak implementation consider only what
happens when there is no malicious behavior; bisimulation and emulation generalize these
notions by taking malicious behavior into account. For some of our results (specifically,
Theorems 4.1 and 4.2), we use these notions, and show that they are achievable under the
conditions of these theorems. In fact, although we don’t need it for our proof, we can show
that we can get t-bisimulation and t-emulation under the conditions of Theorems 4.4 and 4.5
as well. We briefly comment on how this can be done when we present the proof.
We have required schedulers to deliver each message eventually. Because we assume
that protocols in the mediator game are bounded, all protocols in the mediator game must
terminate. This means that we can’t hope to emulate a protocol in the cheap-talk game
that deadlocks. (We assume that if the protocol deadlocks, it has a special output that we
denote ⊥. Given our constraints, we can never get an output of ⊥ in the mediator game.) To
deal with this situation, we relax this requirement on schedulers somewhat, but only in the
mediator game. We take a relaxed scheduler to be one that may never deliver some messages.
However, we require that if the mediator sends several messages at the same step, then a
relaxed scheduler either delivers all of them or none of them. (There is no requirement
on messages sent by the players, since they send messages only to the mediator, and we
can assume without loss of generality that they send only one message at each step.) We
can define relaxed t-emulation just as we defined t-emulation, except that we now allow the
scheduler σe in the definition to be a relaxed scheduler. Finally, we define (t, t
′)-emulation
just as we defined relaxed t-emulation except that σe must be non-relaxed if |T | ≤ t′.
We need a further property to deal with protocols that involve punishment strategies.
For a punishment strategy to be effective, all the honest players have to play it. In our
protocols, the punishment strategy is played when there is a deadlock (so some players never
terminate); that is, the punishment strategy is in the honest players’ “wills”. Thus, we
want it to be the case that either none of the honest players terminate (in which case the
punishment strategy will be effective) or all of them terminate; we do not want it to be the
case that only some of the honest players terminate.
Definition 5.3 (t-cotermination). A protocol ~π t-coterminates if, for all schedulers σe, all
subsets T of at most t players, and all strategy profiles ~τT for the players in T , in all histories
of the protocol (~π−T , ~τT , σe), either all the players not in T terminate or none of them do.
For some of our results, we need “approximate” versions of t-bisimulation, t-emulation, re-
laxed t-emulation, and t-cotermination that allow an ǫ probability of error. For t-bisimulation,
t-emulation, (t, t′)-emulation, and relaxed t-emulation, this means that the distance between
the distribution over outputs in the cheap-talk game and the distribution in the media-
tor game is at most ǫ (where the notion of distance is that used in the definition of ǫ-
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implementation in Section 2) while for t-cotermination it means that the property holds
with probability 1 − ǫ. We call these properties (ǫ, t)-bisimulation, (ǫ, t)-emulation, relaxed
(ǫ, t)-emulation and (ǫ, t)-cotermination.
In [10], the following results are proved:
Theorem 5.4. Given a mediator game Γd extending Γ and a strategy profile ~σ + σd, there
exists a strategy profile ~σCT for ΓCT such that ~σCT t-coterminates, t-emulates (resp., relaxed
(t, t′)-emulates), and t-bisimulates ~σ + σd if t < n/3, t < n/4 (resp., t < n/3 and t
′ < n/4),
and t < n/4 respectively, and the expected number of messages in histories of ~σCT is O(nNc).
Theorem 5.5. Given a mediator game Γd extending Γ, a strategy profile ~σ + σd in Γd, and
a real number ǫ ∈ (0, 1], there exists a strategy profile ~σCT in ΓCT such that ~σCT (ǫ, t)-
coterminates, (ǫ, t)-emulates (resp., (ǫ, t, t′)-emulates), and (ǫ, t)-bisimulates ~σ + σd if t <
n/2, t < n/3 (resp., t < n/2 and t′ < n/3) and t < n/3 respectively, and the expected number
of messages in histories of ~σCT is O(nNc).
6 Proofs of the main theorems
6.1 Coordination between the environment and malicious players
Before proving the main results, it is useful to understand some of the implication of (k, t)-
robustness, particularly when it comes to the interactions between the environment and
the malicious and rational players. The definition of (k, t)-robustness requires that the
rational players have no profitable deviation no matter what the malicious players and the
environment do. It may seem a priori that the malicious players, the rational players, and the
environment all act independently, but in fact, we can assume without loss of generality that
they are all under the control of a single adversary. Clearly rational players can coordinate
by sending messages to each other. But it may not be obvious that the malicious and rational
players can also coordinate with the environment so that, for example, the malicious and
rational players can act knowing who will be scheduled when and the environment can
schedule rational and malicious players based on their inputs. Nevertheless, this follows
from the fact that (k, t)-robustness must hold for all schedulers. We prove this by showing
that rational and malicious players can effectively communicate with the environment, even
though the environment cannot read messages.
To see that a player i can communicate with the environment, recall that we have assumed
that the message space is finite, say {m0, . . . , mM}. Immediately after sending mj, i sends j
empty messages to itself. So, even though the environment cannot read the messages, it will
know that i received mj .
2 (Clearly the environment will also know who sent the message,
since the environment delivered the message.)
2We can encode mj using using fewer messages by having i send message to other agents as well as
itself. Our goal here is not to minimize the number of messages, but to show that communication with the
environment is possible.
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The rational and malicious players know the environment’s protocol (and thus know
when a message that is sent will be delivered). Thus, it suffices for the environment to tell
the non-honest players when the kth message is sent, who sent it, and who the intended
recipient is. All the non-honest players i initially send themselves (n+1)2 empty messages.
If the first message was sent by player j1 to player j2 (treating the mediator as player 0 in
the mediator game), then the environment delivers (n + 1)j1 + j2 of these empty messages.
Then player i sends another (n + 1)2 empty messages, allowing the environment to encode
the sender and receiver of the next message, if there is one.
Because schedulers can collude with the adversary, t-immune strategy profiles satisfy an
even stronger condition: deviations by players in a set T with |T | ≤ t do not make things
worse for the non-deviating players even if the environment colludes with the players in T .
Proposition 6.1. If ~σ is t-immune, then for all sets T of players with |T | ≤ t, strategies σe
and σ′e for the environment, strategy profiles ~τT for the players in T , input profiles ~x and ~x
′,
and players i /∈ T , we have
ui(Γd, (~σ−T , ~τT ), σ
′
e, ~x
′
T ) ≥ ui(Γd, ~σ, σe, ~xT ). (1)
Proof. Clearly, if (1) holds for all σe, σ
′
e, ~x, and ~x
′, then ~σ is t-immune. For the converse,
suppose by way of contradiction that ~σ is t-immunte but for some T , ~τ , σe, σ
′
e, and i /∈ T ,
(1) does not hold. Consider a scheduler σ′′e that acts just like σe, except that if some player
i sends a message to itself it acts like σ′e. Then players in T can effectively decrease i’s
contradicting that payoff with scheduler σ′′e by sending a message to themselves and playing
as if they had input ~x′T ; that is, there is a strategy ~τ
′
T such that
ui(Γd, (~σ−T , ~τ
′
T ), σ
′′
e , ~xT ) = ui(Γd, (~σ−T , ~τT ), σ
′
e, ~x
′
T ) < ui(Γd, ~σ, σe, ~xT ) = ui(Γd, ~σ, σ
′′
e , ~xT ),
contradicting the assumption that ~σ is t-immune. The details for the proof are left
A similar argument shows that (k, t)-robust strategy profiles satisfy a correspondingly
stronger condition, made precise in the following proposition:
Proposition 6.2. A strategy profile ~σ is (k, t)-robust (resp., strongly (k, t)-robust) if and
only if it is t-immune and for all disjoint sets K and T with 1 ≤ |K| ≤ k and |T | ≤ t, all
strategy profiles ~τK , ~τT , and ~τ
′
T for the players in K and T , respectively, all environment
strategies σe and σ
′
e, and all input profiles ~x and ~x
′, we have that
ui(Γd, (~σ−(K∪T ), ~τK , ~τ
′
T ), σ
′
e, ~x
′
(K∪T )) ≤ ui(Γd, (~σ−T , ~τT ), σe, ~xT ) (2)
for some i ∈ K (resp., for all i ∈ K).
Proof. Again, it is clear that if (2) holds for all K and T with 1 ≤ |K| ≤ k and |T | ≤ t, all
~τK , ~τT , ~τ
′
T , ~x, and ~x
′, and some (resp., all) i ∈ K, then ~σ is (strongly) (k, t)-robust.
For the converse, assume by way of contradiction that ~σ is (k, t)-robust, but for some
disjoint sets K and T with 1 ≤ |K| ≤ k and |T | ≤ t, ~τK , ~τT , ~τ ′T , ~x, and ~x′, and all i ∈ K, (2)
does not hold. Again, we use the fact that the rational players can effectively communicate
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with malicious players and with the scheduler. Consider a scheduler σ′′e that acts like σe
unless some player sends a message to itself, in which case it acts like σ′e and a strategy
profile ~τ ′′T in which each i ∈ T acts as if it was using strategy (τT )i, except that it switches
to (τ ′T )i and to pretend have input x
′
i if it receives a message from a rational player asking
it to do so. Then, given input profile ~x, strategy profile ~τ ′′T for T , and scheduler σ
′′
e , player i
can gain by sending a message to itself and sending a message to players in T asking them
to follow ~τ ′T and pretends to have input ~x
′
T , and by making players in K play ~τK as if they
had input ~x′K , rather than playing ~σ. This contradicts the assumption that ~σ is (k, t)-robust.
The argument for strong (k, t)-robustness.
Another property interesting in its own right that follows from this argument is that
(k, t)-robust strategies must be scheduler-proof : the expected payoff for all players is the
same regardless of the scheduler:
Corollary 6.3. If ~σ is (k, t)-robust for some k ≥ 1, then for all sets T with |T | ≤ t, strategy
profiles ~τT for the players in T , environment strategies σe and σ
′
e, input profiles ~x, and players
i /∈ T , we have ui(Γ, (~σ−T , ~τT ), σe, ~xT ) = ui(Γ, (~σ−T , ~τT ), σ′e, ~xT ).
We have analogous strengthenings of ǫ-t-immunity and ǫ-(k, t)-robustness.
The proofs are essentially identical to that of Proposition 6.1, so we omit them here.
Proposition 6.4. If ǫ > 0 and ~σ is ǫ-t-immune in game Γ, then for all sets T of players
with |T | ≤ t, strategy profiles τT for the players in T , environment strategies σe and σ′e, input
profiles ~x and ~x′, and players i /∈ T , we have that
ui(Γ, (~σ−T , ~τT ), σ
′
e, ~x
′
T ) > ui(Γ, ~σ, σe, ~xT )− ǫ.
Proposition 6.5. A strategy profile ~σ is ǫ-(k, t)-robust (resp., strongly ǫ-(k, t)-robust) in
game Γ if and only if it is ǫ-t-immune and, for all disjoint sets K and T of players with
1 ≤ |K| ≤ k and |T | ≤ t, all strategy profiles ~τK and ~τT for players in K and T , respectively,
all environment strategies σe and σ
′
e, and all input profiles ~x and ~x
′, we have that
ui(Γ, (~σ−(K∪T ), ~τK , ~τT ), σ
′
e, ~x
′
(T∪K)) < ui(Γ, (~σ−T , ~τT ), σe, ~xT ) + ǫ
for some i ∈ K (resp., for all i ∈ K).
It will be useful for our later results that we can actually improve on the bound of ǫ in
Propositions 6.4 and 6.5.
Proposition 6.6. If ~σ is an ǫ-t-immune strategy in a finite game Γ, then there exists ǫ0
with 0 < ǫ0 < ǫ such that for all sets of players T with |T | ≤ t, strategy profiles ~τT for the
players in T , environment strategies σe and σ
′
e, input profiles ~x and ~x
′, and players i /∈ T ,
we have that
ui(Γ, (~σ−T , ~τT ), σ
′
e, ~x
′
T ) > ui(Γ, ~σ, σe, ~xT )− ǫ0.
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Proof. Since, by Proposition 6.4, for each choice of ~τT , σe, and σ
′
e, we have
ui(Γ, ~σ, σe, ~xT )− ui(Γ, (~σ−T , ~τT ), σ′e, ~x′T ) < ǫ,
and the space of player strategy profiles, environment strategies, and input value profiles
is compact, if we take the sup of the left-hand side over all choices of strategy profiles ~τT ,
environment strategies σe and σ
′
e, and input profiles ~x and ~x
′, it takes on some maximum
value ǫ1 < ǫ0. We can then take ǫ0 = (ǫ+ ǫ1)/2.
Using Proposition 6.5, we get a similar result for ǫ-(k, t)-robustness. The proof is analo-
gous to that of Proposition 6.6.
Proposition 6.7. If Γ is a finite game and ~σ is a (strongly) ǫ- (k, t)-robust strategy in Γd,
then there exists ǫ0 with 0 < ǫ0 < ǫ such that for all disjoint sets K and T of players with
1 ≤ |K| ≤ k and |T | ≤ t, all strategy profiles ~τK and ~τT for players in K and T , respectively,
all environment strategies σe and σ
′
e, and all input profiles ~x and ~x
′, we have that
ui(Γ, (~σ−(K∪T ), ~τK , ~τT ), σe, ~x
′
(K∪T )) < ui(Γ, (~σ−T , ~τT ), σ
′
e, ~xT ) + ǫ0
for some i ∈ K (resp., all i ∈ K).
6.2 Proof of Theorem 4.1
By Theorem 5.4, if n > 4k+4t, there exists a strategy ~σCT that (k+t)-bisimulates and (k+t)-
emulates ~σ+σd, in which the expected number of messages is O(nNc). It is immediate from
the definition of (k + t)-bisimulation that ~σCT implements ~σ + σd. Since the probability of
deadlock is 0, the action that players play in case of deadlock are irrelevant, so this approach
works equally well for the AH approach and the default-move approach. It remains to show
that, for each utility variant Γd(~u
′) of Γd, if ~σ + σd is a (strongly) (k, t)-robust equilibrium
in Γd(~u
′), then ~σCT is a (strongly) (k, t)-robust equilibrium in ΓCT (~u
′). We start by showing
that ~σCT is t-resilient in ΓCT (~u
′).
Given T with |T | ≤ t, ~τT , and σe, by Theorem 5.4, there exists a function H from
strategies to strategies and σ′e such that, for all input profiles ~x, we have
u′i(ΓCT (~u
′), ((~σCT )−T , τT ), σe, ~x) = u
′
i(Γd(~u
′), (~σ−T , H(~τT )), σ
′
e, ~x)
for all players i. There also exists a scheduler of the form σ′′e such that
u′i(ΓCT (~u
′), ~σCT , σ
′
e, ~x) = u
′
i(Γd(~u
′), ~σ, σ′′e , ~x).
Since ~σ is t-immune, for all i /∈ T we have
u′i(ΓCT (~u
′), ((~σCT )−T , ~τT ), σe, ~xT )
= u′i(Γd(~u
′), (~σ−T , H(~τT )), σ
′
e, ~xT )
≥ u′i(Γd(~u′), ~σ, σ′′e , ~xT ) [by Lemma 6.1]
= u′i(ΓCT (~u
′), ~σCT , σ
′
e, ~xT ).
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Therefore, ~σCT is t-immune.
To show (strong) (k, t)-robustness, taking ~τT , σe, and σ
′
e as above, suppose that K is a
set of players disjoint from T such that |K| ≤ k, and the players in K play ~τK . Then, by
Theorem 5.4, there exists σ∗e such that
u′i(ΓCT (~u
′), ((~σCT )−(K∪T ), ~τK , ~τT ), σe, ~x) = u
′
i(Γd(~u
′), (~σ−(K∪T ), H(~τK), H(~τT )), σ
∗
e , ~x(K∪T ))
for all players i. By Corollary 6.2, if ~σ + σd is (k, t)-robust (resp., strongly (k, t)-robust) in
Γd(~u
′), then
u′i(Γd(~u
′), (~σ−(K∪T ), H(~τK), H(~τT )), σ
∗
e , ~x(K∪T )) ≤ u′i(Γd(~u′), (~σ−T , H(~τT )), σ′e, ~xT )
for some (resp., all) i ∈ K. For those i ∈ K for which this inequality holds, we have
u′i(ΓCT (~u
′), ((~σCT )−(K∪T ), τK , τT ), σe, ~x(K∪T ))
= u′i(Γd(~u
′), (~σ−(K∪T ), H(~τK), H(~τT )), σ
∗
e , ~x(K∪T ))
= u′i(Γd(~u
′), (~σ−T , H(~τT )), σ
′
e, ~xT )
= u′i(ΓCT (~u
′), ((~σCT )−T , σe, ~xT ).
It follows that ~σCT is (strongly) (k, t)-robust in ΓCT (~u
′).
6.3 Proof of Theorem 4.2
The argument is essentially the same as that used for Theorem 4.1, except that we now
use Theorem 5.5 instead of Theorem 5.4. By Theorem 5.5, for all ǫ′ ∈ (0, 1], there exists a
protocol ~σCT that ǫ-(k + t)-bisimulates ~σ, ǫ-(k + t)-emulates ~σ, and uses O(nNc) messages
in expectation. It follows that ~σCT ǫ
′-implements ~σ and has at most a probability ǫ′ of
deadlock. We show next that we can make ǫ′ sufficiently small so that it becomes irrelevant
if we work with the AH approach or the default-move approach.
We can now prove ǫ-(k, t)-robustness. Suppose that ~σ + σd is a (strongly) ǫ-(k, t)-robust
equilibrium in the utility variant Γd(~u
′) of Γd. We show that ~σCT is ǫ-t-immune in ΓCT (~u
′).
Since ~σCT ǫ
′-(k+t) emulates ~σ+σd, given a set T of players with |T | ≤ t, a strategy profile ~τT
for the players in T , and an environment strategy σ′e in the cheap-talk game, by Theorem 5.5,
there exists a function H as in the definition of t-emulation. Moreover, for all inputs ~x, we
can associate histories in the mediator game and histories in the cheap-talk game in such
a way that the set of histories where the outcomes differ has probability at most ǫ′. Since
all utilities are in the range [−M/2,M/2], by assumption, the maximum difference in utility
between two outcomes in the underlying game is M . Thus, there exists an environment
strategy σ′e such that for all input profiles ~x, we have
u′i(ΓCT (~u
′), ((~σCT )−T , H(~τT )), σ
′
e, ~x) > u
′
i(Γd(~u
′), (~σ−T , ~τT ), σe, ~x)− ǫ′M
for all i 6∈ T . Theorem 5.5 also guarantees that there exists an environment strategy σ′′e such
that
u′i(ΓCT (~u
′), ~σCT , σ
′
e, ~x) < u
′
i(Γd(~u
′), ~σ, σ′′e , ~x) + ǫ
′M.
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Since ~σ is ǫ-t immune in Γd(~u
′), by Proposition 6.6, there exists a value ǫ0 with 0 < ǫ0 < ǫ
such that
u′i(ΓCT (~u
′), ((~σCT )−T , ~τ
′
T ), σ
′
e, ~xT )
> u′i(Γd(~u
′), (~σ−T , H(~τT )), σe, ~xT )− ǫ′M
> u′i(Γd(~u
′), ~σ, σ′′e , ~xT )− ǫ0 − ǫ′M
> u′i(ΓCT (~u
′), ~σCT , σ
′
e, ~xT )− ǫ0 − 2ǫ′M.
If we take ǫ′ = (ǫ−ǫ0)/2M , this shows that ~σCT is (ǫ, t)-immune with both the AH approach
and the default-move approach.
To show (strong) ǫ-(k, t)-robustness, keeping T , ~τT , H , σe, and σ
′
e as above, for all sets
K of players disjoint from T with 1 ≤ |K| < k and strategy profiles ~τK , there exists an
environment strategy σ∗e and a value ǫ0 with 0 < ǫ0 < ǫ such that for all input profiles ~x,
u′i(ΓCT (~u
′), ((~σCT )−(K∪T )), ~τK , ~τT ), σ
′
e, ~x(K∪T ))
< u′i(Γd(~u
′), (~σ−(K∪T ), H(~τK), H(~τT )), σe, ~x(K∪T )) + ǫ
′M
< u′i(Γd(~u
′), (~σ−T , H(~τT )), σ
′′
e , ~xT ) + ǫ0 + ǫ
′M [by Proposition 6.7]
< u′i(ΓCT (~u
′), (~σCT )−T , ~τ), σe, ~xT ) + ǫ0 + 2ǫ
′M [by Theorem 5.5].
for some (for all) i ∈ K. This shows that if we take ǫ′ := (ǫ − ǫ0)/2M , then ~σCT is ǫ-
(k, t)-robust. Note that this argument works for both the AH approach and the default-move
approach since it does not depend on the actions played in deadlock.
6.4 Proof of Theorem 4.4
The proof of Theorem 4.4 is similar in spirit to that of Theorem 4.1. The main problem we
have to deal with is that of ensuring that rational players participate. To force participation,
we have the honest players put the punishment strategy in their “wills”, so that if ~σCT ends
in deadlock, the rational players will be punished. Unfortunately, a naive implementation of
this approach does not work, as the following example shows.
Consider an underlying game Γ for n > 3k players where the set of actions is A :=
{0, 1,⊥}. If at least k+1 players play ⊥, all players get a payoff of 1.1; if k or fewer players
play ⊥ and all players play either 0 or ⊥, then all players get a payoff of 1; if k or fewer
players play ⊥ and all players play either ⊥ or 1, then all players get a payoff of 2; otherwise,
all players get 0. Let Γd be an extension of Γ with a mediator. Suppose that the mediator d
uses the following strategy: First, d chooses a value b ∈ {0, 1} with equal probability. Then
d chooses a ∈ {0, 1} with equal probability and sends the message a + bi (mod 2) to player
i (note that the same a is used in all these messages). Finally, d sends the message “output
b; STOP” to all players (so the strategy is in canonical form).
Let σi be the strategy where player i ignores the message a+bi and plays b after receiving
the message “output b”. It is easy to check that ~σ is a k-resilient equilibrium in the mediator
game, and gives players an expected payoff of 1.5. Moreover, playing ⊥ is a k-punishment
strategy with respect to ~σ, since if all but k players play ⊥, then everyone gets a payoff of
1.1 (since at least k + 1 players play ⊥), which is less than 1.5.
The naive approach to implementing the mediator does not work for this game, at least
with the punishment strategy ⊥. For example, suppose that after receiving the messages
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a + bi (mod 2), the rational players communicate with each other. Moreover, suppose that
the set K of rational players includes i and j such that i − j is odd. Then the rational
players can compute b. If b = 0, they actually prefer their payoff with the punishment
strategy to their payoff with ~σCT . Thus, they will stop sending messages. The simulation
will not terminate, so the punishment strategy in the players’ wills will be applied, making
the rational players better off. Thus, we cannot simulate the mediator with this approach.
Of course, there are punishment strategies in this game that would lead to cooperation (e.g.,
randomizing between 0 and 1). Nevertheless, this example shows that using an arbitrary
punishment strategy may not suffice to force the rational players to cooperate.
The problem here is that the mediator tells each player i what a+ bi is. We do not want
the mediator to send such unnecessary information. But what counts as unnecessary? As we
now show, for each strategy profile ~σ + σd of a mediator game we can construct a strategy
~σm + σmd that implements ~σ + σd and leaks no information. More precisely, there exists
a function f from strategy profiles to strategy profiles such that, for all strategy profiles
~σ+σd, f(~σ+σd) implements ~σ+σd and essentially all the mediator sends each player when
playing f(~σ + σd) is the action to play in the underlying game. (If we require only weak
implementation, then this is exactly the case; for implementation, the messages can also
include a round number.) Moreover, if ~σ + σd is (k, t)-robust (resp., strongly (k, t)-robust,
ǫ-(k,t)-robust, strongly ǫ-(k,t)-robust), then is f(~σ+ σd). The construction of f proceeds as
follows:
Let SdetΓd,e/∼ denote the set of ∼-equivalence classes. Thus, SdetΓd,e/∼ is essentially the set
of deterministic environment strategies that result in different outcomes in the underlying
game when the players and the mediator use ~σ + σd in Γd.
The intuition underlying f(σd) is that the mediator chooses an equivalence class in
SdetΓd,e/∼, chooses an environment strategy σe in the equivalence class, and simulates the
outcome of (~σ + σd, σe). In order to get an implementation, we must ensure that it is possi-
ble for f(σd) to choose all possible equivalences classes in SdetΓd,e/∼. To do this, let R be the
least integer such that (Rn)! ≥ |SdetΓd,e/∼|. We show below that we can take R = 2rn log(n).
The mediator σd sends R messages to each player. As we shall see, this suffices for the
mediator to choose all possible equivalence classes in SdetΓd,e/∼.
The strategy f(σi) is straightforward: player i initially sends the mediator the message
(i, 0, xi), where xi is i’s input. Then for 1 ≤ r < R, after receiving a message with content
r from the mediator, player i sends the mediator (i, r, xi). When i receives a message of the
form (STOP, ai) from the mediator, i plays ai and halts.
The mediator f(σd) proceeds as follows: it sends each player i R−1 messages, where the
rth message just says “r”. It then waits until there are at least n− k− t players from which
it has received a valid and complete set of messages, where a set of messages from a player
i is valid and complete if for all r with 0 ≤ r ≤ R − 1, the mediator has received exactly
one message of the form (i, r, x), where x is an input value that i could have, and all the x
values are the same in these R messages. The next time that the mediator is scheduled, it
sends a STOP message to each player with an action to perform. We next explain how the
mediator calculates which actions the players perform.
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Let P be the set of players from whom the mediator has received a valid and complete
of messages when it is next scheduled. There are two cases. If P consists of all players,
this means that the mediator has received Rn messages. There are (Rn)! orders that these
messages could have come in. Moreover, for each possible order of messages, there is a
deterministic scheduler σ′e that delivers the messages in just this order. By choice of R,
(Rn)! ≥ |SdetΓd,e/∼′ |, so there is a surjective mapping HP from each message order to a
scheduler σe in the game Γd. The mediator then simulates a computation of (~σ, σd) with
the scheduler σe corresponding to the message order it actually received (generating the
randomness for all the players and for σd) using the input ~x that it received from the players,
and sends each player i the action that results from this simulation as its Rth message.
Now suppose P , the set of players from whom the mediator has received a valid and
complete of messages when it is next scheduled, does not consist of all players. Let σ′P be a
scheduler in the game Γ′d that resulted in this message order. Consider a fixed scheduler σP
in the game Γd where the messages of all players not in P are delayed until after the mediator
has sent all STOP messages. (There must be such a scheduler, since |P | ≥ n − k − t). Let
~xP be the profile of inputs that the mediator has received from the players in P , and extend
it arbitrarily to an input profile ~x. The mediator f(σd) simulates a computation of (~σ, σd)
with the scheduler σP (again, generating the randomness for all the players and for σd) using
some profile ~x that extends the profile ~xP it received from the players in P (it doesn’t matter
which vector ~x is used, since the mediator σd does not receive messages from players not in
P ), and sends each player i the action that results from this simulation as its Rth message.
If we require only weak implementation, we can make do with far fewer messages. Each
player i just sends the mediator f(σd) an initial message of the form (i, xi). The mediator
waits until it has these initial messages from n− k − t players. If the mediator has received
messages from the players in P when it is next scheduled, it simulates the mediator σP on
some input ~x that extends ~P .
We now show that this construction has the required properties.
Lemma 6.8. Given a finite mediator game Γd that extends an underlying game Γ, a canon-
ical strategy profile ~σ for the players, and a strategy σd for the mediator in Γd, then f(~σ+σd)
implements (resp., weakly implements) (~σ, σd), and if ~σ + σd is (k, t)-robust (resp., strongly
(k, t)-robust, ǫ-(k,t)-robust, strongly ǫ-(k,t)-robust), then so is f(~σ + σd). Moreover, the
number of messages sent in each history of f(~σ + σd) is 2
O(N log(N))(resp., O(n)).
Proof. Implementation (resp. weakly implementation) follows from the construction. Sup-
pose that ~σ+σd is ǫ-(k, t)-robust (resp., strongly ǫ-(k, t)-robust, (k, t)-robust, strongly (k, t)-
robust). We must show that f(~σ + σd) has the corresponding property. The proofs are
essentially the same in all cases; moreover, the same argument works for both constructions
(i.e., both the one the gives implementation and the one that gives weak implementation).
For definiteness, we deal with ǫ-(k, t)-robustness here.
We start by showing ǫ-t-immunity. If f(~σ + σd) is not ǫ-t-immune, then there must be
scheduler σ′e, a set T of players with |T | ≤ t, a strategy ~τT for the players in T , and an input
profile ~xT that shows this. That is, for some i /∈ T , we have
ui(Γ
′
d, (f(~σT ), τT ), σ
′
e, ~xT ) ≤ ui(Γ′d, f(~σ), σ′e, ~xT )− ǫ.
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We can assume without loss of generality that σ′e is deterministic. Moreover, we can further
assume without loss of generality that, when playing with ~τ , the malicious players deviate
only by sending an input other than their actual input. All other deviations correspond to
playing with a different (deterministic) scheduler. Specifically, since the mediator ignores all
messages that are not sent by a player in the set P , the outcome is equivalent to playing
with a scheduler that delays these messages until after the mediator sends its Rth message.
And if a deviating player j does not send a message that it should send or sends a message
late, we can just consider the scheduler that sends messages in the order that f(σd) actually
received them. It now follows that there exists a scheduler σ′′e and an input profile ~x
′
T such
that
ui(Γ
′
d, (f(~σ)T , τT ), σ
′
e, ~xT ) = ui(Γ
′
d, f(~σ), σ
′′
e , ~x
′
T ).
Also, by construction, there exists a scheduler σe such that
ui(Γ
′
d, f(~σ), σ
′′
e , ~x
′
T ) = ui(Γd, ~σ, σe, ~x
′
T )
for some scheduler σe. Similarly, there exists a scheduler σ
∗
e such that
ui(Γ
′
d, f(~σ), σ
′
e, ~x
′
T ) = ui(Γd, ~σ, σ
∗
e , ~x
′
T ).
Thus, we have
ui(Γd, ~σ, σe, ~xT ) ≤ ui(Γd, ~σ, σ∗e , ~x′T )− ǫ.
By Proposition 6.4, this contradicts the assumption that ~σ is ǫ-t-immune.
Now let K be any subset disjoint from T such that 1 ≤ |K| ≤ k. Then, using an
analogous argument, there exists a scheduler σ′′′e and an input profile ~x
′′
T such that
ui(Γ
′
d, f(~σ)−(T∪K), σ
′
e, ~x(T∪K)) = ui(Γ
′
d, f(~σ), σ
′′′
e , ~x
′′
(T∪K)),
for all players i. There also exists a scheduler σ∗∗e and an input profile ~x
′′′
T such that
ui(Γd, f(~σ)−T , ~τT , σ
′
e, ~x(T∪K)) = ui(Γd, f(~σ), σ
∗∗
e , ~x
′′′
(T∪K))
for all players i. Thus,
ui(Γ
′
d, f(~σ)−(T∪K), σ
′
e, ~x(T∪K))
= ui(Γd, f(~σ), σ
′′′
e , ~x
′′
(T∪K))
< ui(Γd, f(~σ), σ
∗∗
e , ~x
′′′
(T∪K)) + ǫ [by Proposition 6.5]
= ui(Γd, f(~σ)−T , ~τT , σ
′
e, ~x(T∪K))
which shows that f(~σ + σd) is ǫ-(k, t)-robust.
It remains to compute the bound on the number of messages sent. Clearly, if all we need
is a weak implementation, then n messages suffice. In the case of implementation, at most
2Rn messages are sent (at most R by each player, and at most Rn by the mediator), where
R is the least integer such that (Rn)! ≥ |SdetΓd,e/∼|. Thus, we must compute an estimate for
the number of equivalence of deterministic schedulers.
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A deterministic scheduler is a function from message patterns to a choice of message
to be delivered, where a message pattern describes which messages have been sent so far,
which were delivered, and the order that the messages were sent and delivered, but not the
contents of the message. For example, taking (s, i, j, k) (resp., (d, i, j, k)) to denote the kth
message sent by player i to player j (resp., that the kth message sent by player i to j is
received by j), and taking the mediator to be player 0, then a typical message pattern might
be (s, 0, 3, 1), (s, 1, 0, 1), (s, 0, 3, 2), (d, 0, 3, 2) is the message pattern where the mediator
first send a message to player 3, then player 1 sends a message t the mediator, then the
mediator sends a second message to player 3, and then then mediator’s second message to
player 3 is delivered. Given this message pattern, the scheduler can choose to deliver the
mediator’s first message to player 3 or the message from player 1 to the mediator. Since the
mediator sends at most r messages to each player, and each player sends at most r messages
to the mediator, message patterns have length at most 4rn. The messages sent by a player
to the mediator are numbered consecutively, as are the messages sent by the mediator to
each player. A straightforward computation then shows that there are at most (4rn)!/(r!)2n
message patterns of length 4rn. It is easy to see that there are fewer message patterns
of length k for k < 4rn, so there are clearly at most (4rn)(4rn)!/(r!)2n message patterns
of length at most 4rn. A message pattern can have at most 2rn undelivered messages, so
there are at most (2rn)(4rn)(4rn)!/(r!)
2n
equivalence classes of schedulers. A straightforward
application of Stirling’s approximation formula (n! ∼ (n/e)n√2πn) shows that R = (4rn)4rn
suffices for our purposes. Since rn is a bound on the number of messages sent, we have
N = rn, completing the proof.
Thus, without loss of generality, we can assume that the players and mediator use such
a strategy profile. We call f(~σ + σd) the minimally informative strategy corresponding
to ~σ + σd. More generally, we say that ~σ
m + σmd is a minimally informative strategy if
~σm + σmd = f(~σ + σd) for some strategy profile ~σ + σd.
Since we consider only mediator games in canonical form, this guarantees termination
for all honest players regardless of the strategy of rational and malicious players, provided
that the scheduler is standard (i.e., not relaxed). However, once we allow relaxed schedulers,
there is a possibility of deadlock. We assume for the purposes of the proof that we use the
AH approach in the mediator game, and have the players play the punishment punishment
strategy in their wills. Since ~σCT guarantees t-cotermination for t < n/3, it follows that
in the cheap-talk game, either all honest players terminate or all honest players play the
punishment strategy. This guarantees that the players get the same payoff in corresponding
histories in the mediator game and the cheap-talk game.
The next step in proving Theorem 4.4 is to show that rational players playing with a
relaxed scheduler cannot get an expected payoff that is higher than their expected payoff
when they play such a minimally informative (k, t)-robust equilibrium strategy with a non-
relaxed scheduler.
Proposition 6.9. If ǫ > 0, ~σ + σd is a minimally informative (strongly) ǫ-(k, t)-robust
equilibrium in a mediator game Γd for which a (k + t)-punishment strategy exists, σE is a
23
relaxed scheduler, K and T are disjoint sets of players with 1 ≤ |K| ≤ k and |T | ≤ t, and
~τ(K∪T ) is a strategy profile for the players in K ∪T , then there exists a value ǫ0 < ǫ such that
for all non-relaxed schedulers σe and all input profiles ~x, we have that
u′i(Γd, (~σ−(K∪T ), ~τ(K∪T )), σE, ~x(K∪T )) < u
′
i(Γd, (~σ−T , ~τT ), σe, ~xT ) + ǫ0
for some (for all) i /∈ T .
To prove Proposition 6.9, we need a preliminary lemma that characterizes deadlocks in
mediator games in canonical form with relaxed schedulers. It also shows that the scheduler
can detect when such a deadlock happens.
Lemma 6.10. A run in a mediator game in canonical form with a relaxed scheduler σE
ends in deadlock iff at some point in the run no player has received a STOP message and
the scheduler does not deliver any of the messages not yet delivered.
Proof. Clearly, if no player has received a STOP messages and all the messages not yet
delivered are never delivered, then the run ends in deadlock. To show that all deadlocks
must be of this form, assume that a player receives eventually a STOP message. Then, since
the mediator sent all STOP messages at the same time, all other players are guaranteed
to receive a STOP message as well, given our assumption that a relaxed scheduler delivers
either all or none of the messages sent at the same time.
Proof of Proposition 6.9. We can view the adversary’s strategy (~τ(K∪T ), σE) as a combination
of (possibly infinitely many) deterministic strategies (~τ ′(K∪T ), σ
′
E). Thus, it suffices to show
the desired result for each of such deterministic strategies.
Let (~τ ′(K∪T ), σ
′
E) be a deterministic strategy for the adversary in the support of (~τ(K∪T ), σE).
By the properties of our construction, the fact that the adversary is deterministic, and the
fact that a relaxed scheduler must either deliver all the STOP messages from the mediator
or deliver none, it follows that, for a given input ~x(K∪T ), either all runs end in deadlock or
all honest players terminate.
Suppose that for some deterministic adversary (~τ ′(K∪T ), σ
′
E) and input ~xK∪T all honest
players terminate. Consider a non-relaxed scheduler σ′e that acts just like σ
′
E , except that
whenever it detects a deadlock (as characterized by Lemma 6.10, using the fact that the
mediator’s rth message to each player includes STOP), it instead delivers a message chosen
at random. Then, σ′E and σ
′
e are indistinguishable when the players in K ∪ T play ~τ ′(K∪T ).
Therefore, there exists a value ǫ′ < ǫ such that
u′i(Γd, (~σ−(K∪T ), ~τ
′
(K∪T )), σ
′
E, ~x(K∪T ))
= u′i(Γd, (~σ−(K∪T ), ~τ
′
(K∪T )), σ
′
e, ~x(K∪T ))
< u′i(Γd, (~σ−T , ~τT ), σe, ~xT ) + ǫ
′ [by Proposition 6.7]
for some (for all) i ∈ T and all non-relaxed schedulers σe. Suppose instead that all runs with
adversary (~τ ′(K∪T ), σ
′
E) end in deadlock. Then, there exists a value ǫ
′ < ǫ such that
u′i(Γd, (~σ−(K∪T ), ~τ(K∪T )), σ
′
E , ~x(K∪T ))
< u′i(Γd, ~σ, σe, ~x(K∪T )) [by definition of (t + k)-punishment strategy]
< u′i(Γd, (~σ−T , ~τT ), σe, ~xT ) + ǫ
′ [by Proposition 6.6]
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Using a compactness argument analogous to that of Proposition 6.6, there exists a value
ǫ0 < ǫ such that ǫ
′ ≤ ǫ0 for all relaxed adversaries (~τ ′(K∪T ), σ′E) in the support of (~τ(K∪T ), σE)
and all inputs ~x(K∪T ). So
u′i(Γd, (~σ−(K∪T ), ~τ(K∪T )), σE, ~x(K∪T )) < u
′
i(Γd, (~σ−T , ~τT ), σe, ~xT ) + ǫ0
for all inputs ~x(K∪T ), all non-relaxed schedulers σe, all strategies ~τ(T∪K), and for some (for
all) i /∈ T .
An analogous argument can be used for the errorless case:
Proposition 6.11. If ~σ+ σd is a minimally informative (k, t)-robust strategy in a mediator
game Γd(u
′
i) for which a (k+ t)-punishment strategy exists, σE is a relaxed scheduler, T and
K are disjoint sets of players with |T | ≤ t and 1 ≤ |K| ≤ k, and ~τ(K∪T ) is a strategy profile
for the players in K∪T , then there exists a (non-relaxed) scheduler σe such that for all input
profiles ~x and all i /∈ T ,
u′i(Γd, (~σ−(K∪T ), ~τ(K∪T )), σd, σE, ~x(K∪T )) ≤ u′i(Γd, (~σ−T , ~τT ), σd, σe, ~xT ).
We can now prove (strong) (k, t)-robustness. Let Γd(~u
′) be any utility variant of Γd such
that ~σ + ~σd is a (k, t)-robust equilibrium of Γd(~u
′), let σ′e be any scheduler in ΓCT (~u), and
let K and T be disjoint subsets of players with 1 ≤ |K| ≤ k and |T | ≤ t, respectively, such
that 3k+4t < n. Let ~τK and ~τT be strategy profiles for players in K and T , respectively. By
Theorem 5.4, there exists a function H and a relaxed scheduler σE in the cheap-talk game
such that
u′i(ΓCT (~u
′), (~σCT )−(K∪T ), ~τK , ~τT ), σ
′
e, ~x(K∪T )) = u
′
i(Γd(~u
′), (~σ−(K∪T ), H(~τK), H(~τT )), σd, σE, ~x(K∪T ))
for some (for all) i /∈ T and all input profiles ~x. We can assume without loss of generality
that (~σ, σd) is minimally informative. Thus, by Proposition 6.11, there exists a non-relaxed
scheduler σe such that
u′i(Γd(~u
′), (~σ−(K∪T ), H(~τT ), H(~τK)), σd, σE , ~x(K∪T )) ≤ u′i(Γd(~u′), (~σ−T , H(~τT )), σd, σe, ~x(K∪T )).
Finally, by Theorem 5.4, there exists a non-relaxed scheduler σ′′e such that
u′i(ΓCT (~u
′), ((~σCT )−T , ~τT ), σ
′
e, ~xT )
= u′i(Γd(~u
′), (~σ−T , H(~τT )), σd, σ
′′
e , ~xT ) [by Theorem 5.4]
= u′i(Γd(~u
′), (~σ−T , H(~τT )), σd, σe, ~xT ) [by Corollary 6.3].
Therefore,
u′i(ΓCT (~u
′), ((~σCT )−(K∪T ), ~τK , ~τT ), σ
′
e, ~x(K∪T )) ≤ u′i(ΓCT (~u′), ((~σCT )−T , ~τT ), σ′e, ~xT ),
as desired. ⊓⊔
We remark that, with a little more effort, we can show that the minimally informative
strategy f(~σ + σd) that implements ~σ + σd is actually a t-bisimulation and a t-emulation
of of ~σ + σd. Moreover, the cheap-talk strategy that implements f(~σ + σd) preserves these
properties. Thus, under the conditions of Theorem 4.4, we can get a cheap-talk strategy
that t-bisimulates and t-emulates a strategy in the mediator game.
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6.5 Proof of Theorem 4.5
To prove Theorem 4.5, we use an analogous strategy to that used to prove Theorem 4.4,
using Theorem 5.5 instead of Theorem 5.4. The same argument as that used in the proof
Theorem 4.2 shows that for all ǫ′ ∈ (0, 1] there exists a protocol ~σCT that ǫ′-implements
~σ + σd and that ~σCT is (ǫ, t)-immune.
To prove (strong) ǫ-(k, t)-robustness, fix an adversary A = (~τK , ~τT , σe) for subsets K, T
such that 1 ≤ |K| ≤ k, |T | ≤ t and K ∩ T = ∅. By Theorem 5.5, there exists a function H
from strategies to strategies and a relaxed scheduler σE such that, for all input profiles ~x,
ui(ΓCT , ((~σCT )−(K∪T ), ~τK , ~τT ), σe, ~x(K∪T )) < ui(Γd, (~σ−(K∪T ), H(~τK), H(~τT )), σd, σE , ~x(K∪T ))+ǫ
′M
for some (resp. for all) i ∈ K.
By Theorem 5.5, there exists a non-relaxed scheduler σ′e such that
ui(ΓCT , ((~σCT )−T , ~τT ), σe, ~xT ) > ui(Γd, (~σ−T , H(~τT )), σd, σ
′
e, ~xT )− ǫ′M.
Thus, we have that
ui(ΓCT , ((~σCT )−(K∪T ), ~τK , ~τT ), σe, ~x(K∪T ))
< ui(Γd, (~σ−T , H(~τT )), σd, σ
′
e, ~xT ) + ǫ0 + ǫ
′M [by Proposition 6.9]
< ui(ΓCT , ((~σCT )−T , ~τT ), σe, ~xT ) + ǫ0 + 2ǫ′M.
for some ǫ0 < ǫ. Therefore, taking ǫ
′ := (ǫ − ǫ0)/2M , we have that ~σCT is a (strongly)
ǫ-(k, t)-robust equilibrium for ΓCT .
Again, as was the case for Theorem 4.4, with a little more effort we can show that
under the conditions of Theorem 4.5, we can get a cheap-talk strategy that t-bisimulates
and t-emulates a strategy in the mediator game.
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